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LYING, DECEPTION, AND
THE VIRTUE OF TRUTHFULNESS:
A REPLY TO GARCIA
Thomas Williams

In "Lies and the Vices of Deception," J. L. A. Garcia argues that lying is
always immoral, since it always involves a motivation contrary to the proper discharge of a morally determinative role. I argue that Garcia fails to
show (i) that anyone who fails in the sub-role of information-giver thereby
fails in a morally determinative role, (ii) that the sub-role of informationgiver is precisely that of "informing another truthfully," (iii) that lying deviates from the motivation characteristic of someone with the virtue of truthfulness, and (iv) that lies always undermine the well-being of the person to
whom they are told.

J. L. A. Garcia defends the sort of rigorist approach to lying that has lately fallen on hard times. After briefly
expounding his version of virtue ethics, which serves as the theoretical
underpinning for his arguments, he explains that lying is always contrary
to virtue and therefore always immoral. Other forms of deception, he continues, are not contrary to virtue in the same way or to the same degree;
although purposive deception is "presumptively vicious" (525), it need not
be-as lying always is-impermissible.
Unlike most philosophers nowadays, I do not rule out in advance any
view according to which lying is always impermissible (although I have
not been persuaded by any such view that has been offered to date); and I
actually agree that lying is at least sometimes more seriously contrary to
virtue than are other forms of deception. But despite my readiness to see
merit in Garcia's conclusions, I do not find his arguments persuasive.
Much like Kant on the same subject, Garcia indulges in hyperbolic language that will move someone under its spell only so long as she can keep
from asking herself what the naked facts look like without all the rhetorical
clothing. I shall argue that there is nothing in Garcia's version of virtue
theory that supports either claim: he does not show that lying is always
impem1issible, or even that it is more seriously contrary to virtue than any
other form of deception.
For Garcia, a virtue is "a trait that counts towards someone's being good
in one or another of certain personal role-relationships" (522). The traits in
question will be dispositions to be motivated in certain ways. Goodness in
a role-relationship is evaluated from the perspective of the patient rather
than that of the agent: "whether [my motivational dispositions] fulfill those
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relationships is a matter of whether, in having them, I live up to what those
in whose lives I occupy those roles need and benefit from in having them
filled" (523). Thus, I have a virtue when I (i) occupy a certain sort of role
with respect to another person and (ii) am disposed to be motivated in
ways that (iii) make me good in that role, where (iv) what makes me
"good-in-a-pertinent-role-to-you ... is your need, your flourishing, your
benefiting, your having a good life" (523). An action's being morally
wrong or impermissible is then explained "in terms of its being distant
from and opposed to virtue so to behave" (522).
I will not stop to ask whether this is the right conception of virtue.
Instead, let us assume that it is correct and then ask whether Garcia is right
to think that lying is always seriously contrary to virtue as thus understood. When one makes an assertion, one occupies "a special relationwithin-a-relation with those addressed" (524). This relationship is too
fleeting and engages too little of one's moral self to make it a role, as Garcia
acknowledges; but it constitutes a sub-role, that of "information-giver."
This sub-role "can occur within many role-relationships that collectively
compose the moral life" (524), and so goodness in discharging the sub-role
can count towards goodness in discharging the larger roles. Hence, there
are standards of virtue that apply to the sub-role of information-giver.
Now at this point we might think that Garcia has shown only that standards of virtue will apply to our assertions whenever those assertions contribute to our discharge of a special relationship with someone-so that it
might turn out to be vicious to lie to friends or family members but not to
strangers. But one of the morally determinative role-relationships Garcia
recognizes is the relationship we have to "what Christians call 'neighbor',
which applies to anyone insofar as she is conceived as somehow a fellow
traveler in life's journey" (522).2 Thus (apparently) whenever we make an
assertion to anyone at all, we occupy the sub-relationship of informationgiver in a morally determinative relationship. Our being good in that subrole will contribute to our being good in the larger role, and (more crucially) our deliberate subverting of that sub-role will constitute a subverting of
the larger role. Knowingly to make a false assertion is to deviate in the
greatest possible way "from the information-giver's (sub-role-)task of
informing another truthfully. Other deceptions mislead but only lies really
misinform" (525, emphasis in original). Lies, therefore, are always impermissible, because they always involve a full-blown deviation from goodness in some morally determinative role.
This conclusion comes too quickly, however; four steps in the argument
need further elaboration and defense. First, since Garcia has conceded that
information-giving is not a role in itself, but a sub-role of larger morally
determinative roles, he must show that one who deviates from goodness in
the sub-role of information-giver will necessarily deviate from goodness in
the larger role. Otherwise it could tum out that someone might violate the
sub-role without violating any morally determinative role. Second, since he
has said that virtue and vice involve the manner in which we carry out roles,
he must show that he has properly characterized the (sub-) role of information-giver as that of "informing another truthfully." 1£ the role is more properly characterized in some other way, it could tum out that one could some-
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times misinform another person and nonetheless not deviate from virtue. It
could also turn out, contrary to what Garcia hopes to show, that misinforming someone will be no more vicious than misleading her. Third, since he
has associated virtue so closely with motivation, he cannot show that lying is
vicious without showing that it deviates from the motivation characteristic of
someone who has the virtue of truthfulness. So we need an account of the
motivation that operates in the truthful person before we can assess the
turpitude of someone who lies, or even see whether all lies deviate from that
motivation. Fourth, since goodness in a moral role is supposed to be measured by the need, benefit, or flourishing of the patient, Garcia must show
that lies always undermine the well-being of the person to whom the lie is
told. It seems to me that Garcia fails to provide persuasive arguments on
any of these points. I shall take each point in turn.
For the first point I shall assume that anyone who lies is violating the
sub-role of information-giver (an assumption I call into question below in
discussing the second point) and ask whether Garcia gives us any reason to
believe that such a violation will necessarily constitute a violation of some
larger morally determinative role. I cannot see where he does this. It is not
even plausible to think this is the case within friendship. If my best friend
asks me whether he did well at his last AP A presentation, and I reassure
him that he did quite well even though in fact I think he was made to look
rather foolish, I have not behaved badly to him as a friend~r at least it is
not obvious that I have, and Garcia gives me no reason to think I have.
'Friendship', in fact, is not a univocal term; it names a variety of relationships with differing expectations, degrees of intimacy, and purposes. For
that reason I suspect it would be a hopeless task to derive so specific an
injunction as the requirement never to lie from any considerations about
lithe role" of friendship. Now if (as in my example above) I were to lie to
my best friend, I would be failing him as a friend; but that is because of the
particular nature of our friendship, where it is understood that we will be
honest even under such circumstances. We have an implicit agreement to
be truthful with each other. But Garcia cannot avail himself of this move,
since he does not wish to ground the immorality of lying in any implicit
promises to be truthful; and it seems clear that there are some friendships
worthy of the name in which no such agreement exists. In fact, it seems
plausible to think that in certain sorts of friendship, and under certain circumstances, one would be required to lie in order to be good as (that sort of)
friend. Suppose that what my friend wants, needs, and expects from me
when asking a certain question is reassurance; suppose also that I cannot
be both reassuring and truthful. Under such circumstances I would surely
be acting badly as a friend if I told the discouraging truth instead of offering a reassuring lie. So goodness as a friend seems not only to be consistent with lying, but even sometimes to require lying.
When it comes to the generalized role of 'neighbor', it becomes even less
plausible to suppose that a violation of the role of information-giver necessarily constitutes a violation of the larger role. For one thing, I do not see
how we can specify what it is to be good in so vague and diffuse a role
without having specified in advance what good character is in general.
What could it mean for me to be a good 'neighbor' (in the Christian sense
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of that word) other than to be a good person in my dealings with whomever I happen to encounter? So the notion of good person must be prior to
the notion of good neighbor.
Leaving that worry aside, though, and assuming that we can somehow
identify independently what constitutes goodness in the role of neighbor,
we must still be shown that lying automatically deviates from goodness in
that role. The closest we find to such an argument is Garcia's contention
that lying constitutes treachery:
In asserting p to you, I present myself as someone for you to trust (on
p itself, at least). It is this personal connection, this 'sub-role', that I
establish and offer you in making the assertion, and that I also betray
in an especially egregious way when I act with intentions diametrically opposed to what I should intend when so connected to you:
specifically, the intent that you possess the truth on p, which intention would count towards my fulfilling my part of the connection
that I offer. That is to say, I betray you in this when I lie. (528)
But essential to the concept of betrayal is that I have a special relationship with the person I have betrayed. I can harm or degrade or insult a
complete stranger, but I cannot betray her. If I harbor a fugitive and then
decide to tell the police his whereabouts, I have betrayed him; but if I merely see a fugitive running past and then inform his pursuers which direction
he took, I cannot be said to have betrayed him, though I may have harmed
him in some other way and perhaps even done him an injustice. So whatever might be happening when I lie to Kant's celebrated murderer when
he comes to my door, it certainly is not betrayal.
Garcia wants to insist, of course, that there always is such a special relationship when T make an assertion, even to Kant's murderer: "the agent
lures the aggressor with assurances that she can depend on the agent in
this respect, all the while planning the double-cross on that very matter ....
[T]he liar acts with ill will inasmuch as she means to seduce her audience
into a relationship of trust and dependence for purposes of betraying it"
(529-530). Now we can agree that someone who behaves in the way Garcia
describes is treacherous and vicious, but as a description of my lying to the
murderer this is purely fanciful. I have not lured or seduced anyone into
anything. And I see no reason to suppose that being a good neighbor to
someone requires me never to encourage her in a false belief. As Garcia
acknowledges, virtue is compatible with the use of force; it would follow
that I can be a good neighbor to someone against whom I am using force,
even (under the right circumstances) to someone whom I am killing. 3 Is
lying so much more serious than force that it is never compatible with
goodness as a neighbor? As Duns Scotus observed, "It is less bad to take
away true opinion from one's neighbor, or to be the occasion of generating
false opinion in him, than to take away his bodily life. Indeed, there is
scarcely a comparison."4
Garcia's arguments in fact suggest that he does not take seriously
enough his own identification of information-providing as a sub-role. He
makes no real effort to show how badness as an information-provider nec-
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essarily involves badness in a larger role. He seems to think, in other
words, that information-providing is itself a morally determinative role.
Thus we come to my second point. Supposing that information-providing
reaIIy is a morally determinative role, has Garcia characterized that role
properly? According to him, what is central to performing well as an
information-giver is to be committed to the information-recipient's having
the truth about the very proposition one asserts. Therefore, if I mislead
without actually lying, I have not deviated so badly from my role as information-provider that I am thereby guilty of doing something morally
wrong (though there is a defeasible presumption that I have done so).
I find this restriction purely stipulative. It is wholly arbitrary to define
information-giving so that it just means asserting propositions one believes
to be true. As part of an argument, the definition is probably also questionbegging. Garcia argues that lying is always wrong because it seriously
undermines one's role as information-provider, but the role of information-provider turns out to consist, by definition, precisely in not lying.
Furthermore, a reasonable, non-stipulative understanding of the role of
information-provider will not support the distinction Garcia wishes to
draw between lies, which are always immoral, and deception, which is
only presumptively immoral. Suppose (to adapt one of his examples) that
a colleague who missed the department colloquium asks me how the
speaker'S talk went. Now it was a perfectly brilliant piece of philosophy,
but I am filled with ill-will towards the speaker, so with raised eyebrows
and a devious smirk I tell my colleague, "Well, there was certainly nothing
wrong with her grammar." Apart from the desire to save the traditional
distinction between lying and other forms of deception, is there any reason
at all to think I have done better as information-provider than I would
have if I simply said, "It was awful"?
Consideration of my third point might help Garcia's case here. Virtue,
according to Garcia, is supposed to be bound up with our motivations.
The person with the virtue of truthfulness, in other words, is one who is
characteristically motivated in a certain way. If it can be shown that lying
is more seriously contrary to that motivation than any other form of deception, the traditional distinction can perhaps be saved. Unfortunately we
run into a problem similar to the one I have complained about with respect
to Garcia's description of the information-provider's role. He identifies the
characteristic motivation of the truthful person as follows: "it is S's commitment to A's having the truth about what she asserts-p itself-that is
central to S's being good in her sub-role of A's information-provider" (526527). But we need further argument to show that the characteristic motivation of the honest person is a commitment to other people's having the
truth about exactly those propositions that she asserts to be true-in other
words, a commitment not to lie. I would argue that so stingy a commitment to truth is not enough to justify characterizing someone as honest.
For a commitment not to lie is compatible with all sorts of low cunning,
dissimulation, hypocrisy, conniving, suppression of truth, and the like. To
describe as honest someone who is habitually motivated to act in any of
those ways seems clearly mistaken. Recall the example of my crafty
answer to my colleague's question. Isn't my answer, technically truthful
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though it is, every bit as contrary to the usual motivation of the honest person as an outright lie would have been?
Of course, even if we answer yes to that last question, I have done no
more than undermine the distinction between lies and other forms of
deception; it could still be true--as far as the present argument goes-that
all lies are immoraP (Then all deception would tum out to be immoral as
well.) As long as the honest person is characteristically motivated never to
lie (even if, as I have suggested, her motivation qua honest person is not
exhausted by her commitment not to lie), all lies would turn out to be
immoral. But is that indeed part of the characteristic motivation of the
honest person? On an Aristotelian conception of honesty, the honest person will be one who deals truthfully with others insofar as truthful dealing
with others conduces to or in part constitutes her good qua human. An
Aristotelian who wanted to maintain a rigorist position on lying would
therefore be obligated to show that no person of practical wisdom could
ever see a lie as anything other than a deviation from her proper good.
Such a view has little intuitive plausibility, and I cannot imagine how one
would go about constructing an argument for it.
Now Garcia is not an Aristotelian on this issue, so the argument he must
make is somewhat different. For him-and here we come to our fourth
and final point-the goodness of virtuous motivation is not to be found in
the well-being or flourishing of the virtuous agent but in that of the patient.
If he is to answer the challenge I have posed, therefore, he must show that
lies always harm the person to whom they are told. I find three arguments
for this claim. First, the very inordinateness of a lie "consists in and constitutes an injury to the neighbor, even if it causes her no further harm" (528,
emphasis in original). What is that inordinateness? It "consists in the contrariety of the action's motivational input to the sort of motivation someone
in the neighbor's position needs for the information-giver to live up to the
spirit of her role" (528). We have already seen that this answer will not do.
The role of information-giver is not itself morally determinative, and badness in that role does not entail badness in any role that is morally determinative. Moreover, it has not been established that the motivational input
involved in lying is necessarily contrary to the characteristic motivation of
the honest person. Finally, the argument is viciously circular. It is intended as proof that lies injure the person lied to because they diminish her
well-being. But this injury is said to consist in the fact that the liar's motivation is contrary to what the person lied to needs, i.e., to some constituent
of her well-being. Now the element of well-being at issue here cannot be
anything other than the state of not having been lied to. So the argument
amounts to this: lying to someone harms her because it makes it the case
that someone has lied to her.6
The second argument for the claim that lies always harm the person lied
to is that lies always involve betrayal. I have already cast doubt on the
notion that lying essentially involves betrayal, so there is no need to deal
further with that contention. The third argument is that lying always
degrades the person to whom the lie is told. Garcia argues that "[t]o
degrade or manipulate is to treat with contempt, and contempt is an indignity and therefore a violation of the dignity and respect that ground
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human rights" (529). But Garcia acknowledges that it can sometimes be
licit to kill a would-be attacker. Now we can either say (implausibly) that
in killing the attacker we do not treat him with contempt, degrade him, or
manipulate him; or we can say (more plausibly) that we do indeed treat
him with contempt (and so forth), but justifiably so. If we take the first
option in describing cases of force, it would seem also to be available for
describing cases of deception: we could say with equal plausibility that in
lying to Kant's murderer we are not treating him with contempt. Similarly,
if we take the second option in describing cases of force, we can take it in
describing cases of deception: we could admit that we are treating the
would-be murderer with contempt, but insist that we are justified in doing
so. After all (to return to Scotus's point) if the right not to be deprived of
life is defeasible, the right not to be lied to is surely defeasible.
For all these reasons I remain unpersuaded that Garcia's virtue theory
implies an absolute prohibition of lying. It seems quite possible for someone to lie without contravening the motivation that typically operates in
someone with the virtue of honesty, without doing unjustified harm to the
person to whom the lie is told, and without acting badly in any morally
determinative role. 7

University of Iowa
NOTES
1. Faith and Philosophy 15 (1998): 514-537.
2. One might well wonder at this point whether the notion of a role-relationship has been so emptied of specificity that we are now working with a
Kantian wolf in an Aristotelian sheep costume, but I will not pursue that worry
here.
3. As an alternative, one might say that neighborliness does exclude the
use of force, but there are some people with respect to whom neighborliness is
not morally required. This alternative would obviously not help Garcia's case,
since even if neighborliness excludes lying, lies to those who fall outside the
required scope of neighborliness might be licit.
4. Ordinatio 3, d. 38, q. un., n. 5. Minus enim malum est auferre proximo
opinionem veram, vel occasionaliter generare in eo opinionem falsam, quam
auferre sibi vitam corporalem; imo non est quasi comparatio.
5. I do, however, take my argument under the first point to have established that Garcia has given us no good reason to think all lies are immoral.
6. Could Garcia save his argument by identifying the element of wellbeing as the possession of true belief? No, because deception of any form
would undermine that.
7. I am grateful to John Corvino, Richard Fumerton, and Diane Jeske for
their helpful comments.

